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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the ATVC Actuator Subsystem FMEA/CIL
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FM_A and CIL. I0 October 1986.
The IOA effot fist completed and analysis of the Ascent Thrust
Vector Control Actuator (ATVC) hardware, generating draft failure
modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence,
this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with
proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter ATVC hardware.
The IOA produt for the ATVC actuator analysis consisted of
twenty-five failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in sixteen
potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made
to the NASA baseline (as of 7 December 1987) which consisted of
(Note i) twenty-one FMEAs and Thirteen CIL items. The comparison
dtermined if there were any results which had been found by the
IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced
agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all
non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement. Based on discussions with
the NASA subsystem manager, no additional non-CIL FMEAs are
anticipated for the post 51-L update. Figure ! presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
Note I. The comparison of NASA FMEA Non-CIL item is based on the
Pre 51-L baseline since all Post 51-L FMEAs have not been
received as date of this report.
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Figure 1 - MAIN ENGINE ACTUATOR ASSESSMENT SUMMARY _ _
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessmen£
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
u
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51_L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
t
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Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
w
2.4
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. There were no subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions used in this analysis.
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SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Design and Function
ORi,(_It,-ALPAGE IS
OF POOR QUALIFY
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The ATVC servoactuators gimbal the main engines in pitch and yaw
to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent.
There are two Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) actuators for
each ME, one for pitch movement and one for yaw movement. Each
actuator receives four command voltages, one from each ATVC
driver electronics channel. Each actuator employs two of the
three Orbiter hydraulic systems (one primary and one secondary).
Each METVC servoactuator consists of the following components:
l. Switching valve. Two Orbiter hydraulic systems are
connected to the valve. The output from the valve connects
to four servovalves and to a power spool. The valve will
shift position when the hydraulic pressure from the
controlling hydraulic system is less than 1200 to 1500 psi
and will furnish standby pressure to the actuator.
2. Four electro-hydraulic servovalves. Each servovalve
consists of a second-stage valve, a torque motor assembly
with power valve feedback wire, a mechanical position
feedback spring cage assembly, a bypass valve, a dynamic
pressure feedback valve, and a secondary delta pressure
transducer. The function of the servovalve is to generate
secondary hydraulic pressure to drive a power spool valve in
response to position commands from the ATVC electronic
driver.
3. Torque motor assembly. The assembly _nsists of dual
magnets, a flapper valve and two feedback wires attached to
- the flapper; one wire is linked to the servovalve and the
other is linked to the power spool valve. The wires are
used to control the spool velocity. When a command voltage
generates a torque, it causes the flapper to rotate in a
clockwise or counterclockwise direction causing a pressure
buildup in either the right or left sections of the
servovalve, thus moving the valve to the right or left.
_When the valve is displaced, the hydraulic pressure is
transferred to the power spool which then transfers
hydraulic pressure to the primary drive piston.
4. Mechanical position feedback assembly. The assembly links
each of the four torque motor flappers to the primary
piston. The assembly allows the flapper to rotate initially
in response to a command voltage input, and then
mechanically moves the flapper back to its neutral position
as the primary piston reaches its commanded position.
w
. Bypass valve. The bypass valve isolates a servovalve when a
secondary delta pressure is determined to be bad by the
ATVC electronics. When an isolation command is issued to a
solenoid a piston shuttles against a spring. This allows
hydraulic pressure to shuttle a second piston which inhibits
:t :- ;:; : ........
5
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.hydraulic fl0W from the servovalve to the power piston.
This equalize_ pressure on both sides of the hydraulic
supply which allows the servovalve to float, thus isolating
it from the system.
Secondary delta pressure transducer. Each servovalve has a
transducer which measures the resistance its servovalve sees
relative to the other three servovalves. It sends signals
to the ATVC electronics which determines which, if any,
delta pressure is outside allowable limits. If a delta
pressure fails, the TVC sends an isolation command to the
bypass valve.
• Power spool valve assembly. Each actuator has one power
spool which provides primary hydraulic pressure to the
primary piston. The power spool consists of a cylinder that
contains a linear power spool. The power spool has a
central position whose motion is driven by the summation of
the secondary delta pressure from the four servovalves.
When the power spool is displaced, hydraulic fluid is
directed through a lock valve to the primary piston• The
lock valve hydraulically isolates the cylinder and primary
piston from the hydraulic source to prevent further movement
of the primary piston. If there is a hydraulic failure, the
lock valve spool moves (due to spring pressure) to a closed
position which locks the primary piston in its last
commanded position• A force limiter valve limits internal
cylinder pressure to 4050 psi. (The valve was used during
the OFT program to determine side loads during main engine
gimbaling.) The valve is functionally non-critical.
Instrumentatio_ has been removed from the Orbiter.
• Cylinder and ram/piston assembly• The assembly produces
linear motion (extend or retract) to move the SSME in pitch
or yaw, and mechanical position feedback cam and a feedback
scissor assembly which connects to the mechanical position
feedback spring cage assembly. The main cylinder reservoirs
receive hydraulic pressure or return the Orbiter hydraulic
supply through the feed/return lines leading to the power
valve via the lock valve• As the ram moves, the scissor
assembly contracts or expands, pushing the mechanical
linkage (up or down) which moves the torque motor flapper•
When the piston/cam reaches its commanded position, the
feedback assembly removes secondary fluid pressures to the
power valve.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The ATVC servoactuators interface with the four ATVC electronics
drivers which receive commands via four MDMs from the four GPCs.
Crew initiated command inputs are through the GPCs. The crew can
turn power on or off to any ATVC channel and place a FCS channel
in OVERRIDE which bypasses the ATVC fault detection circuitry•
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
_ _ALIT¥
i
I
IB
zI
I
m
m
lib
i
m
lib
li
lib
L_
m
4
=
w
w
BII
IBm
BB
wz
=
Each actuator is fastened to the Orbiter thrust structures and
to the powerhead of one of the three SSMEs,
Crew inputs fall into three areas, rotational hand controller
(RHC) commands, override commands and ATVC power.
The FA MDMs and the ATVC electronic drives are located in
Avionics Bays 4, 5 and 6.
FCS channel monitor switches are located on Panel C3. The ATVC
power switches are located on Panel 017.
The two displays relative to MPS ATVC are the caution and warning
(C&W) matrix (Panel F7) and the GNC System Summary 1 display.
The GNC System Summary 1 display (PASS and BFS) shows a down
arrow for an FCS channel that has isolated a failed servovalve
and a fault message.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 is a block diagram of the ATVC servo actuators. Figures
3 through 8 show components which were analyzed for failure
modes.
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Figure 2 - ME TVC ACTUATOR BLOCK DIAGRAM
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the ATVC actuator hardware initially
generated twenty-five failure mode worksheets and identified
sixteen Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the
assessment process. The results were compared to the proposed
Post 51-L baseline (5 May 1987) of (Note i) twenty-one FMEAs and
fifteen CIL items and the updated (7 December 1987) version of
(Note i) twenty-one FMEAs and thirteen CIL items. The
discrepancy between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be
explained by the different approach used by NASA and IOA to group
modes. Upon completion of the assessment and after discussions
with the NASA subsystem manager, an agreement between the NASA
FMEA/CIL items and the IOA failure modes was reached.
Note i. Have received Post 51-L CIL Items Only. Have not
received all the Post 51-L NASA FMEAs as of the date of this
report. Non-CIL items comparison was based on review of NASA Pre
51-L baseline and IOA analysis.
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failuremodes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to
be mapped into NASA FMEAs.
ATVC Actuator IOA IOA
Elements Unmapped Mapped NASA Issues
Hydraulic Valve
Module 20 17 17
Servoactuator 3 2 2
Primary Piston
Assembly 2 2 2
25 21 21
0
0
0
0
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure modes identified and assessment. Appendix D highlights
the NASA critical items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous analysis results reported in STS Engineering and
Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-06,
Analysis of the ATVC actuator, 3 December 1986. No supplemtal
analysis worksheets were generated for the ATVC assessment.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheets. IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
w
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A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
l
m
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Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
2 2 0o Servoactuator
o Hydraulic Valve Module
Elements
o Switch Valve
o E-H Servovalve
o Filter
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Spool
o Check Valve
o Lock Valve
o Force Limiter Valve
o Dynamic Press Fdble
Valve
o Flow Cutoff Valve
o Primary Piston Assy
o Mech. Fdble. Assy
o Cylinder and Ram/
Piston
TOTAL
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
21
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
2 2 0o Servoactuator
o Hydraulic Valve Module
Elements
o Switch Valve
o E-H Servovalve
o Filter
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Spool
o Check Valve
o Lock Valve
o Force Limiter Valve
o Dynamic Press Fdble
Valve
o Flow Cutoff Valve
o Primary Piston Assy
o Mech. Fdble. Assy
o Cylinder and Ram/
Piston
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL 13 13 0
L
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEAbaseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
m
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TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
o Servoactuator
o Hydraulic Valve
Module Elements
o Switch Valve
o E-H Servovalve
o Filter
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Spool
o Check Valve
o Lock Valve
o Force Limiter Valve
o Dynamic Press Fdble
Valve
o Flow Cutoff Valve
o Primary Piston Assy
o Mech. Fdble. Assy
o Cylinder and Ram/
Piston
TOTAL
i/1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2/IR
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
4 o
TOTAL
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
21
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Of the failure modes analyzed, fifteen were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
o Servoactuator
o Hydraulic Valve
Module Elements
o Switch Valve
o E-H Servovalve
o Filter
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Spool
o Check Valve
o Lock Valve
o Force Limiter Valve
o Dynamic Press Fdble
Valve
o Flow Cutoff Valve
o Primary Piston Assy
o Mech. Fdble. Assy
o Cylinder and Ram/
Piston
TOTAL
i/l
I
1
1
1
2
8
2/IR
1
2/2 3/IR
1
1
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
13
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
w
o Servoactuator
o Hydrauliv Valve
o Primary Piston
Assembly
ATVC-IOI thru ATVC-I03
ATVC-I04 thru ATVC-120
ATVC-121 thru ATVC-125
L •
w
19
4.1 Servoactuator
Failures which were related to the servoactuator as an entity
were first analyzed. Critical failures were associated with
gross loss of hydraulic fluid due to complete seal failure, and
hydraulic manifold rupture. Hydraulic fluid loss was also
caused by component rupture such as EH servovalves, dynamic
pressure feedback valves, force limiter valves and lock valves.
There were no differences between the IOA and NASA analysis.
4.2 Hydraulic Valve Module
Components of the hydraulic valve module were individually
analyze. Most critical failures of these components included
loss of command signal input; check, power, switch and lock valve
failures due to contamination, clogged filters. One IOA failure,
ruptured filter, was determined to be a non'credible failure
during the assessment process. Since no known conditions could
exist that would rupture the filter no FMEA was considered
necessary. Two failures (open/closed) of the dynamic pressure
feedback valves were identified by the IOA which had not been
included in the pre-51L NASA FMEA/CIL. Th_function of the
valves is to apply a damping force at the servovalve assembly to
damp engine resonance during periods of high vibrating. The
original IOA analysis considered the failures to be non-critical.
There failure modes were discussed with NASA. Further analysis
by RI showed that the failures were critical and could cause the
actuators to become unstable resulting in possible loss of engine
control. A criticality of 3/IR with FFP of screens was assigned
the failures. The only other differences were minor and involved
pass/fail of redundancy screen B for three criticality 2/IR
items. Two IOA failures assigned a criticality of 2/IR were
downgraded to 3/IR; and one other IOA failure (3/3) was upgraded
to 3/IR during the assessment process.
4.3 Primary Piston Assembly
Critical failures associated with the primary ram/piston assembly
were due to mechanical failures, fractures and jammed components.
These failures module jamming or separation of the mechanical
position feedback spring cage assembly, loss of the piston rod
gland retention in the main body, and fracture of the tail stock
(thrust structure), piston rod end (engine), piston head and
piston rod. There were no differences between the IOA and NASA
analysis.
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4.4 Failure Comparison
The main reason for IOA intially having more CIL items than NASA
was that NASA combined failure of components which had the same
effect, whereas the IOA wrote failure sheets for each item.
Review of the NASA CIL items showed that all of the IOA failures
had been analyzed. Since the combined failures all resulted in
the same effect it was concluded that there were no issues with
IOA. Minor differences such as pass or fail of screens were
readily resolved. Frequent discussions with the subsystem
manager resulted in a better understanding of the system and
component operation. As a result of these discussions several
IOA criticalities were downgraded. In addition, an additional
failure mode not included in the Pre 51-L NASA FMEAs was added to
the Post 51-L baseline.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
ATVC
BFS
C&W
CIL
CRT
delta P
E-H Servo VLV
F
FCS
FMEA
GNC
GPC
HW
IOA
MDAC
MDM
METVC
ORIDE
PASS
RI
RHC
SSME
SRB
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Backup Flight System
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Differential Pressure
- Electro-Hydraulic Servovalve
- Functional
- Flight Control System
- Failure Modes Effect Analysis
- Guidance Navigation and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Thrust Vector Control
- Override
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Rockwell International
- Rotational Hand Controller
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Solid Rocket Booster
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
u
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 0c_ober 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO___AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT___OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY M_SS_ON TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATiONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJO_MODE {MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(0ms)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
U
b
i
mm
m
ms
[]
|
[]
U
U
[]
m
m
i
m
m
B-2
I
U
ur
=,
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRTMAR¥ MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF M_SSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONOR@_T ?HASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
D_ORB_T PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
_AND_NG/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends wi£h the completion of post-landing
safing operations
u
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
PreDaration of FMEA/C!L, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
I •
•
.
.
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter avaiiability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown. _
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
g
I
m
I
m
m
|
m
mm
l
mm
m
m
N
i
ms
w
i
l
B-4
I
mm
wL .....
w
w
Lz
L_
.
.
•
.
I0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 ATVC Actuator - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level of the ATVC actuator. The analysis considered the
worst case effects of the hardware or functional failure on
the subsystem, mission and crew and vehicle safety.
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DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Actuator Subsystem. The information on these worksheets
facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-
L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets included in Appendix
E. Each of these worksheets identifies the NASA FMEA being
assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E),
hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens, and
recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
u
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LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
m
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike)all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P _' Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
L
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
B
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-101
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
02-6-A01-I
ATVC
i01
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
R. WILSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT_ :!
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA COVERS FAILURES WHICH WERE WRITTEN AS SEPARATE
FAILURES BY IOA; ATVC-101 AND ATVC-102. NO DISAGREEMENT WITH
COMBINING FAILURES UNDER ONE FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-102
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
102
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
_ CiL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
4
L
m
w
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA COVER FAILU_S _CH WERE WRITTEN'AS SEPARATE
FAILURES BY IOA; ATVC-101 AND ATVC-102. NO DISAGREEMENT WITH
COMBINING BOTH FAILURES UNDER ONE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-3
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-103
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
103
METVC SERVO ACTUATOR (6)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA CRITICALITY. NO ISSUE.
ix]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-104
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-SW-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE (6)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[p] [F] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
AGREE THAT FAILURE FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: A_C-105
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-5
NASA DATA: : ........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: EH SERVOVALVE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
('ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH RI/NASA THAT A __R ,FA_LUP__ _pF _,_EI SERVOVALVE IS
DETECTABLE AND CAN BE ISOLATED, LEAVING THREE GOOD SERVOVALVES.
NASA INCLUDED THIS FAILURE AMONG OTHER FAILURES HAVING THE SAME
EFFECT IN FMEA 02-6-A01-5. THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT WITH
INCLUDING THE FAILURES IN THE SAME FMEA. FAILURES ARE COVERED BY
MDAC ID 105, 109 AND II0.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-106
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-SV-19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 106
ITEM: EH SERVOVALVE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE FAILURE OCCURS WHEN COMMANDING AT OR NEAR THE NULL
POSITION, THE FAULT DETECTION CIRCUITRY CANNOT DETECT THE
FAILURE. THIS FAILURE WOULD GO UNDETECTED AND THE NEXT FAILURE
WOULD LEAVE TWO OPERATING CHANNELS. THE HARDWARE IS 3/IR;
HOWEVER, THE FAULT DETECTION CIRCUITRY CANNOT DETECT WHICH OF THE
2 CHANNELS IS GOOD IF ONE SHOULD FAIL. THIS COULD RESULT IN A
POSSIBLE FORCE FLIGHT BETWEEN THE TWO CHANNELS WITH A RESULTING
LOSS OF CONTROL.
NO CRITICALITY ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-7
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-107
NASA-FMEA #: 02-6-A01-FE-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 107
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
C ]
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-108
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ i*
CP] CF] CP] [ ]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
u
m
w
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA. THIS IS A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE SINCE NO
KNOWN CONDITIONS COULD EXIST WHICH WOULD RUPTURE THE FILTER.
NASA CIL PRE-BOARD ACTIVE - DELETE AS BEING A NON-CREDIBLE
FAILURE.
NO ISSUE. INITIAL ANALYSIS WAS IN ERROR SHOWING PASS oR
FAIL OF SCREENS. FAIL OR PASS OF SCREENS SHOULD BE NOT
APPLICABLE.
L=K-.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENTID: A_C-109
NASA FMEA #: 02-06-A01-5
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 109
ITEM: TORQUE MOTOR ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ P ] [ ] *
[P] [X]
[ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA INCLUDED THIS FAILURE AMONG OTHER FAILURES WHICH HAVE
THE _SAME EFFE_IN _O_ FMEA. THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT WITH
INCLUDING THE FAILURE IN THE SAME FMEA. FAILURES ARE COVERED BY
MDAC ID 105, 109 AND ii0.
NO ISSUE. CONCUR WITH RI/NASA THAT THIS FAILURE OF THE
SERVOVALVE MOTOR IS THE SAME AS HARDOVER FAILURE (MDAC ID 105)
WHICH IS DETECTABLE, CAN BE ISOLATED AND LEAVES THREE GOOD
CHANNELS.
I
ms
m
[]
ms
ms
z
m
m
|
=_
m
i
m
m
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-i0 I
[]
i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II0
NASA FMEA #: 02-06-A01-5
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: II0
ITEM: TORQUE MOTOR ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
u
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA INCLUDED THIS FAILURE AMONG OTHER FAILURES WHICH HAVE
THE SAME EFFECT IN FMEA 02-06-A01-5. THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT
WITH INCLUDING THE FAILURE IN THE SAME FMEA. FAILURES ARE
COVERED MDAC ID 105, 109, AND ii0.
NO ISSUE. CONCUR WITH RI/NASA THAT THIS FAILURE OF THE
SERVOVALVE MOTOR FLAPPER IS THE SAME AS HARDOVER FAILURE (MDAC ID
105) WHICH IS DETECTABLE, CAN BE ISOLATED AND LEAVES THREE GOOD
CHANNELS.
w
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-II
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
W
im
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-III
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-FB-14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
Iii
MECHANICAL POSITION FEEDBACK SPRING CAGE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
!
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ATVC-II2
02-6-A01-II
ATVC
112
BYPASS VALVE
R. WILSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-13
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mR
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II3
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
113
SECONDARY DELTA-P TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[P]
[F]
[N]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO CRITICALITY ISSUE. AGREE WITH NASA ASSESSMENT, FAILURE OF ONE
TRANSDUCER IS DETECTABLE AND LEAVES THREE GOOD TRANSDUCERS FOR
REMAINING SERVO CHANNELS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II4
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-PS-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
114
POWER SPOOL VALVE ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II5
NASA FMEA #: 02-06-A01-CV-16
NASA DATA ........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 115
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II6
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-CV-17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 116
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
n
i i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA CRITICALITY. THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS
CONSIDERED THAT IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE AND
THE CHECK VALVE FAILS OPEN THAT THE ACTUATOR LOCK VALVE ALSO HAD
TO FAIL OPEN TO CAUSE A PROBLEM. HOWEVER, DISCUSSIONS WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER INDICATES THAT WITH HIGH HINGE MOMENTS THE BACK
PRESSURE EXERTED ON THE LOCK VALVE WILL PREVENT LOCK VALVE FROM
FUNCTIONING AND THE ENGINE CAN GO HARDOVER THEN THE LOCK VALVE
WILL FUNCTION AND LOCK THE ENGINE AT THIS FUNCTION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESS_NT ID: ATVC-II7
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-LV-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 117
ITEM: LOCK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II8
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-LV-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 118
ITEM: LOCK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
[ i/I ]
[ i/I ]
REDUND_CY SCREENS _ CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
n
L]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-II9
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-7
NASA DATA"
_BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
119
FORCE LIMITER VALVE
LEAD ANALYST : R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESS_NT DATE: I_/0V/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-120
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
120
FORCE LIMITER VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) :
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
w
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-121
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
121
CYLINDER AND RAM/PISTON ASS'Y
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-122
NASA FMEA #: 02-06-A01-FA-23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
122
DYNAMIC PRESSURE FEEDBACK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NASA PRE 51-L BASELINE. ' FOR
THE POST 5i'LUPDATE NASA/_I°AGREED TO THIS FKILURE BUT HAVE MADE
IT A 3/IR CRIT, AND A CIL ITEM BASED ON FAILURE OF SCREENS A AND
B. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA, IOA CONCURS WITH
COVERSBOTH ATVC-122 AND ATVC-Ii3FAILURES. IOACONCURS WiTH
NASA/RI. (LOSS OF THREE OF THE FOUR VALVES COULD RESULT IN AN
UNSTABLE ATUATOR UNDER CERTAIN VIBRATION CONDITIONS WHICH
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.)
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESS_NT ID: ATVC-123
NASA FMEA #: 02-06-A01-FA-23
NASA DATA: ,
B_SELINE[ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATVC
123
DYNAMIC PRESSURE FEEDBACK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A i B C
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
IN]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NASA PRE 51-L BASELINE. FOR
THE POST 51-L UPDATE NASA/RI AGREED TO THIS FAILURE BUT HAVE MADE
IT A 3/iR CRIT, AND A CIL ITEM BASED ON FAILURE OF SCREEN A AND
B. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA, IOA CONCURS WITH
THE NEW FMEA/CIL. THERE IS FURTHER AGREEMENT THAT ONE FMEA/CIL
WILL COVER BOTH ATVC-123 AND ATVC-122 FAILURES. IOA CONCURS WITH
NASA/RI. (LOSS OF THREE VALVES COVERED RESULT IN AN UNSTABLE
ACTUATOR UNDER CERTAIN VIBRATION CONDITIONS WHICH COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-124
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-21
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 124
ITEM: FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ATVC-125
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A01-22
SUBSYSTEM: ATVC
MDAC ID: 125
ITEM: FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ] w
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APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
m
u
w
w
NASA FMEA
02-6-A01-I
02-6-A01-I
02-6-A01-13
02-6-A01-SW-4
02-6-A01-SV-19
02-6-A01-FE-3
02-6-A01-FB-4
02-6-A01-PS-2
02-6-A01-CV-16
02-6-A01-CV-17
02-6-A01-LV-19
02-6-A01-LV-10
02-6-A01-6
02-6-A01-FA-23
02-6-A01-FA-23
MDAC ID
I01
102
103
104
106
107
III
114
115
116
117
118
121
122
123
ITEM
SERVOACTUATOR
SERVOACTUATOR
SERVOACTUATOR
SWITCH VALVE
E-H SERVOVALVE
FILTER
MECHANICAL POSITION
FEEDBACK ASSEMBLY
POWER SPOOL
CHECK VALVE
CHECK VALVE
LOCK VALVE
LOCK VALVE
CYLINDER AND RAM/
PISTON ASSEMBLY
DYNAMIC PRESSURE
FEEDBACK VALVE
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
COMPONENT
RUPTURE DOWNSTREAM
OF SWITCHING VALVE
LEAKAGE, ELASTOMERIC
SEAL FAILURE
FAIL TO TRANSFER
FAIL TO TRANSFER
CLOGGED
JAMMED OR
SEPARATED
JAMMED
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
FRACTURE
FAIL OPEN/CLOSED
FAIL TO RETURN TO
NULL
w
w
D-I
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wAPPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
w
w
m
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
06, Analysis of the ATVC Actuators, (3 December 1986). Prior
results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, _nstructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top. There were no supplemental analysis worksheets
generated for the ATVC Actuators.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
w
z
L
E
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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wAPPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA
and corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix
E. The Appendix F comparison identifies the NASA FMEA Number,
IOA Assessment Number, criticality and redundancy screen data,
and IOA recommendations.
Appendix F Legend,
Code Definition
All initial IOA criticality and redundancy screen
differences were resolved with the NASA subsystem manager.
In addition, the combining of like failures under one FMEA
were agreed to.
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